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Predicating the Good 
L. A. KOSMAN 
A lthough the general intent of Aristotle's argument in Nico- 
machean Ethics I, 6, 1096a23-27 is clear, the exact nature of 
the claim on which the argument rests is not obvious. Aristotle 
writes: 
e'Tt 8E'ZL 'r'C(MO' Ta':aov Z0 t5 XCYSO y Tac OT ot (t yaXp eV rTZ 7L )4yerrxt 
tOV 'o Os64 Xat o 0VOuq, XOCL EV TCO) 7QL&) OAL apSeat, xcat eV To 7rOaCO) 
,Q rpLov, xOc eV TC 7tpo6 Tt 'r yp-yL.OV, >XCL EV CM(p6 ZX LpOq, Xw ?V 
T67m) aLaXLro xcdL 9repa rotcxao) 
What does Aristotle mean by the claim that good is said in as many 
senses as being, and how are we to understand the explanatory clause 
which follows? The usual reading of this passage takes Aristotle to be 
making one of two claims, depending upon whether the categories are 
viewed as classifying types of entity or types of predicate: (a) items 
in all categories have good predicated of them, or (b) good can be 
predicated in all the categories of predication. In either case, what 
follow are understood as subjects of exemplary predications. Thus 
"olov 4o Oek xac o voi5" is elliptical for "olov 6o Oe6 xoXt 4 voiu &yCXO6q 
?arLIv," in which good is (a) predicated of a substance, God and intelli- 
gence, or (b) predicated in the first category of some entity, namely 
God and intelligence. (I am throughout understanding "God and 
intelligence" as a hendiadys). Similarly, "occ aiperot" is elliptical for 
"oML aperoL MyYOodL da[v,' in which good is (a) predicated of a quality, or 
(b) predicated in the category of quality of some entity, and so on. 
It is such a reading which is found in most translations of the passage 
in question. I quote here only two: 
Further, since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it is 
predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of 
reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. 
of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and 
in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right 
locality and the like), . . 1 
I Translation by W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard 
McKeon, (New York, 1941). 
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Secondly, the term "good" has as many meanings as the word 
"is": it is used to describe substances, e.g., divinity and intelli- 
gence are good; qualities, e.g. the virtues are good; quantities, e.g., 
the proper amount is good; relatedness, e.g., the useful is good; 
time, e.g., the right moment is good; place, e.g., a place to live is 
good; and so forth.2 
But is this the correct reading of Aristotle's argument? Suppose we 
understand Aristotle to be claiming (a) that good can be predicated 
of entities in any category. Why then the peculiar choice of examples 
in the first category? We also say that men, cabbages, and elephants 
are good; why couldn't these serve as well as examples of substances 
of which good is predicated? And why should Aristotle have given 
examples here, while in the other categories mentioned, he presents 
what clearly must be taken as explications: "good is predicated of 
qualities, namely the virtues". 
If, on the other hand, we take Aristotle to be arguing (b) that good 
can be predicated in any category, greater difficulties ensue. "iv rC CL 
[C'rL] XeyeaOOCL" is Aristotle's normal expression for predication in the 
first category, where that means predication of an element in a thing's 
't ea'T or ou6Lcx. It would follow, then, that "4 Oc xoXL 0 6VOi4 iy(04 
eaTLv" is an essential predication - that good is the tL Eart or ouat of 
God and intelligence. 
Were this so, Aristotle's choice of God and inteHigence would become 
explicable. But it is impossible, just for the reasons set forth in this 
passage, that good should be the T'l ?iTt or oUacLcx of anything. One 
important and central consequence of the categorical diversity of 
being is that there is no entity whose essence it is to be: "'rop 3'eVaL oix 
o4aLx o68vVL o6 y&p y'vo4 To 'v." (Posterior Analytics II, 6, 92b13) 
Similarly, because good is not a genus, as the discussion in question 
is meant to show, it is impossible that it should be the re aTn or ouaLo 
of anything. Even if we were to allow the possibility that good might 
constitute the essence or part of the essence of an entity, we should 
still have difficulty with the passage. For if anything looks like a case 
of essential predication, "virtue is good" does, or "the right amount is 
good". But in that case, the point is lost, for then these are not pred- 
ications in other categories at all, but eV 'cd 't. 
The implausibility of either reading is made clearer by attention to 
the language of the passage. For if Aristotle is presenting what are 
2 Translation by Martin Ostwald, Nicomachean Ethics, (New York, 1962). 
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the subjects of predications in the various categories, we should expect 
to find a different construction. Aristotle's meta-descriptions of 
predication usually take the form: predicate in the nominative followed 
by "XiyeaOa" or "xcT-jyopFoZaOoa" followed by "xoct&" followed by 
subject in the genitive. We should therefore expect to find not "o70v o 
Oe64 xot 6O vo5q. ... Ml &pe'T(. . . TO peTpLOV etc.," but "ot0v xocL& TOV O5OU 
Xcl ToV VOV .o.. x%ou r-& 4pToV.. . .ara TO 'pLTpou etc.." It is such a 
construction which we find, for example, at Posterior Analytics I, 22, 
83 a 28: "otov xovra' o5oi) avOp6cou TO6 ?VuxOv [Xe'year.]," and at Categories 
2, 1 a21: "otov ̀ vOpwrnoq xocO' UTOXLaL?vou p.ev )1yETot TO5 Ttv6q c06p6 7nou. " 
What the language of the passage appears instead to suggest is that 
God and intelligence, the virtues, etc., are meant not to be subjects, 
but rather to be predicates. But how are we to understand this? It will 
help to pay closer attention to the claim that good is said "'LaozW4 lxj 
6vrL," for the passage will become clearer if we see predication of the 
good in strict analogy with predication of being. 
The doctrine of the categories is just the claim that TO' O6v 7VzC- 
x6yeTaL. In making this claim, Aristotle is not primarily claiming that 
being is predicated of many kinds of things, but that many kinds of 
being are predicated of entities, or that being is predicated in 
many senses, just as many as there are categories. "xA' ocaur 8e 
EIvOC )IYETOCL 6UOUtsp 0xLvEL Tc u')OCTOC T14 x-TJyopL0x 06acz yMp 
?eye'at, Tocura)x TO VOac O?aLV-t, e7UeL OUV TxxV XCXTyOpOULEVWOV TAO 
cV Tt'L CrT L& a 7OLOV,..." (Metaphysics A, 7, 1017a22). 
When I say that Socrates is a man, this is to predicate of him a certain 
kind or sense of being, being what he is. When I say that he is cultured, 
this is to predicate of him another kind or sense of being, being a 
certain quality, and similarly, when I say that he is five feet tall, or in 
the Lyceum, or has his shoes off, etc. 
"Socrates has his shoes off" is an interesting case, for it is not imme- 
diately obvious that this is an instance of predicating being. It is clear, 
however, that we could rephrase this as "Socrates is barefoot," so 
that the respect in which we have a predication of being becomes 
apparent. Aristotle makes just this point following the passage I have 
quoted: "ox'O&v y&p lxcp6pzt 106 IvOpconoq uytcxLvov arlv I TO tavQposro4 
UYLEVet, OV8? TO 0CVporOq P&GV ?C6TLV T, TeVO2AV TQU &V6pGi7tO r3O4EL T 
TepaV6, O&OW)4 8t xi e7 -'V &v?@ov." (Metaphysics A, 7, 1017 a27) What 
this shows is that it is possible in Greek as in English to predicate 
being without explicitly using the verb "JvaL" or "to be." Thus to say 
"Socrates is a man" is to predicate being in the category of rL ?artC, to 
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say "Socrates is cultured" is to predicate being in the category of 7tOLoV, 
and to say "Socrates walks" is equally to predicate being (in the 
category of noLetv) even though no explicit use is made of the verb 
"to be." 
It is equally possible to predicate good of items without any explicit 
use of the locution "is good." And this fact lies behind Aristotle's point 
in the Ethics. To say of something that it is virtuous or is a virtue is a 
way of predicating good, relative to the category of quality. Similarly, 
to say that something is at the right time, or is in the right amount, 
or is in its proper place, is to ;say it is good relative, respectively, to 
time, quantity, and place. 
We may now understand the nature of Aristotle's argument in the 
Ethics. He begins by claiming that good, like being, is predicated in 
many categories, that is, that there are many ways of being good. 
He then gives examples of predicates which are (disguised) means of 
predicating good in each of the categories. To say of God and intelli- 
gence that it is God and intelligence is to predicate ev w-, -, for in doing 
so we state what something is. At the same time, however, it is to 
predicate good of God and intelligence. For God is the best kind of sub- 
stance one can be, and thus in stating what God is, one is also predi- 
cating good of him. It is not, however, that good is what God is; what 
he is is God, but that's a good thing to be. Similarly, when we say 
that Socrates is courageous, we predicate ev tj7Mi, but we also 
predicate good of him. For being courageous or being virtuouis in 
general is a good way to be; courage and virtue in general, that is, 
are good qualities. The same analysis applies in each of the other 
categories. The instances that Aristotle gives, then, are not the sub- 
jects of exemplary predicative statements, but rather the predicates 
of such statements. They make clear that the multivocity of "good" 
is exhibited not only in the fact that many sorts of things may be 
said to be good, but more in the fact that predicates of radically 
different type are in fact disguised means of predicating the good in 
radically different senses. 
Haverford College 
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